Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Political centralization: Political centralization refers to the concentration of power, decision-making, and authority within a single governing body or entity, diminishing regional or local autonomy. See also Federalism, Autonomy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Daron Acemoglu on Political Centralization - Dictionary of Arguments
Acemoglu I 86 Political centralization/Acemoglu/Robinson: In the same way that there is no reason why political institutions should automatically become pluralistic, there is no natural tendency toward political centralization. (Cf. >Economic growth/Acemoglu). There would certainly be incentives to create more centralized state institutions in any society, particularly in those with no such centralization whatsoever. For example, in Somalia, if one clan created a centralized state capable of imposing order on the country, this could lead to economic benefits and make this clan richer. What stops this? The main barrier to political centralization is again a form of fear from change: any clan, group, or politician attempting to centralize power in the state will also be centralizing power in their own hands, and this is likely to meet the ire of other clans, groups, and individuals, who would be the political losers of this process. Acemoglu I 87 Political centralization is likely only when one group of people is sufficiently more powerful than others to build a state. Acemoglu I 93 (...) political centralization is key to both ways in which growth under extractive political institutions can occur. >Economic growth/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 102 The Glorious Revolution was the foundation for creating a pluralistic society, and it built on and accelerated a process of political centralization. It created the world’s first set of inclusive >political institutions. As a consequence, economic institutions also started becoming more inclusive. >Institutions/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 114 Africa: Africa was the part of the world with the institutions least able to take advantage of the opportunities made available by the Industrial Revolution. It is the part of the world where centralized states formed very late and very tenuously. Where they did form, they were Acemoglu I 115 likely as highly absolutist as the Kongo and often short lived, usually collapsing. Africa shares this trajectory of lack of state centralization with countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Nepal, which have also failed to impose order over their territories and create anything resembling stability to achieve even a modicum of economic progress. >Economic Development/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 131 Soviet Union: the Soviet Union was able to generate rapid growth even under extractive institutions (>Terminology/Acemoglu). Acemoglu I 132 because the Bolsheviks built a powerful centralized state and used it to allocate resources toward industry. But as in all instances of growth under extractive institutions, this experience did not feature technological change and was not sustained. Growth first slowed down and then totally collapsed. Though ephemeral, this type of growth still illustrates how extractive institutions can stimulate economic activity. Acemoglu I 149 Extractive institutions are so common in history because they have a powerful logic: they can generate some limited prosperity while at the same time distributing it into the hands of a small elite. For this growth to happen, there must be political centralization. Once this is in place, the state—or the elite controlling the state—typically has incentives to invest and generate wealth, encourage others to invest so that the state can extract resources from them, and even mimic some of the processes that would normally be set in motion by inclusive economic institutions and markets. Acemoglu I 463 Literature: The role of political centralization and state institutions in development has been most heavily emphasized by historical sociologists following the work by Max Weber. Notable is the work of Mann (1986(1), 1993(2)), Migdal (1988)(3), and Evans (1995)(4). 1.Mann, Michael (1986). The Sources of Social Power. Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2. - (1993). The Sources of Social Power. Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-states, 1760–1914. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3.Migdal, Joel S. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 4.Evans, Peter B. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
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